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Abstract
Starting from Marcel Mauss’ observation that “one has no right to refuse a gift”, this paper
explores the politics of refusal in the context of field trials with genetically modified organisms
in Flanders (Belgium). Based on a decade of activist research, and focusing on the genetically
modified organism field trials of the Flemish Institute for Biotechnology, we show that the busi-
ness model of this strategic research center – with its triple mission of carrying biotechnology
research, technology transfer, and the promotion of biotechnology through communication and
lobby activities – fosters a climate in which innovations in the technosciences have to “be accept-
ed”. The future is laid out without including the possibility of refusal. Consternation is great when
this is exactly what happens. Irrational fears and lack of understanding or lack of familiarity are
invoked to explain refusal. Language of precision, innovation, safety, and control are deployed to
re-assure the public. Refusal is not considered a legitimate option. Yet, if farmers and grassroots
initiatives would accept the gift of genetically modified organisms, it would mean the acceptance
of their dispossession and the impossibility of diverse food sovereignties. Starting from theoret-
ical work on “the gift” and “the politics of refusal”, we argue that recognizing innovation as the
intrinsically plural and divergent process it is, entails including options to refuse particular path-
ways as a first step to open up others. As we will argue, saying no to genetically modified
organisms is part of saying yes to peasant autonomy, agrobiodiversity, and peoples’ food
sovereignties.
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Introduction
One has no right to refuse a gift. (Mauss 2002: 52)
To refuse is to say no. But, no, it is not just that. To refuse can be generative and strategic, a
deliberate move toward one thing, belief, practice, or community and away from another.
Refusals illuminate limits and possibilities . . . (McGranahan, 2016b: 319)
In the morning of 24 April 1987, about 70 journalists gathered in a field in California to
document the first authorized release of a genetically engineered microbe into the environ-
ment.1 The microbe, genetically modified to increase frost resistance of fruits, had already
slalomed a number of obstacles in its trajectory towards commercial diffusion. After three
years of legal battle, and 14 years after molecular biologists first spliced genetic material
from one bacterium into another to create a recombinant bacterium, strawberries coated
with ice minus pseudomonas (trademarked as Frostban) were now ready to confront the
public eye. The night before the strawberries had to be sprayed, the Berkeley Greens
uprooted a few thousands of the coated strawberry plants.2
The mediatization and public contestation of the world’s first official field trial with
genetically modified organisms (GMO) initiated a dialectic that would become a classic in
the subsequent history of the agrifood technosciences. The mediatization of the installation
of GMO field trials had to show the publics that the seclusion of scientist, bacteria and other
organisms in laboratories had not been in vain. After years of hard work and longstanding
public and private funding, the scientists had come back with a gift for society. They
brought genetically modified plants and bacteria which were only waiting to be adapted
and adopted for a variety of uses in agriculture and industry. Peasants and grassroots
initiatives responded to the gift with public campaigns against GMOs, including legal battles
and sometimes the destruction of field trials. Major points of opposition are GMOs’ key
role in the growing privatization of life through patents and licensing agreements, as well as
their broader role in the continuous encroachment on people’s food systems by a few trans-
national seed and agrochemical corporations (Howard, 2009; McAfee, 2003; Wright, 2005).
This paper thinks through the politics of refusal to explore how such actions resist and
reframe the agrifood technosciences. It scrutinizes what happens when a product ridden
with intellectual property rights and unequal power relations is imposed and normalized. It
shows how refusal in the context of the genetic modification of plants is not a “negation of
the need for dialogue” (Wright, 2018: 130) but a refusal to be drawn into politics that
obstruct peasant autonomy and peoples’ food sovereignties.
GMO field trials – whether or not fenced off with anti-climbing material, carried out on
roof tops, topped with barbed wires, under the watchful eye of security cameras or human
guards – have clearly captured the collective imagination. In anglophone media, reports can
be found of citizens’ interference with field trials in a wide variety of countries including the
Philippines, France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, the US,
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and Brazil. Such interactions of peasant and grassroot groups with experimental field trials,
reaching a peak in the 1990s and 2000s are significant. What is being “field tested” is more
than just science, seed multiplication or even productivity. As we will argue in this article,
field tests are also meant to provide insights into societies’ willingness to acquiesce to these
new interventions (see also De Krom et al., 2014b). These experiments show that at least
part of the population, in different places around the globe, are not willing to accept the
unnegotiated use of GMOs in food and agriculture. Rachel Schurman and William Munro
(2003) describe how in the mid-1990s, when GMOs “hit the ground running” a
“proliferation of citizens’ voices challenging the biotechnology industry on economic, envi-
ronmental, cultural, and moral grounds” emerged. As they comment, “long before trans-
genic crops made their way to the market, individuals and groups concerned about the
dissemination of these new technologies were already questioning their safety, utility, and
necessity” (p. 124). In the meantime, GMO scientists and science communicators appear to
be surprised that people do not accept their gift. After all, in innovation language – much
spoken in technoscience policy arenas and well documented in an imposing literature in the
field of innovation studies – favored novelties are self-evidently to be spread, diffused,
adopted, and “recombined” in follow-up inventions (Giuliani et al., 2011; Leary, 2019;
Nelson and Winter, 1977; Stirling, 2014).
But why do certain technologies not diffuse? When it comes to the analysis and descrip-
tion of non-diffusion – the lack of adoption of perceived novelties – the language of inno-
vation studies is much more impoverished. Obviously, an innovation can simply be
unsuccessful in its aspired practical role, and it has long been well acknowledged that
what is at stake here extends well beyond technical aspects alone (Bathelt et al., 2012).
Yet whilst social and political aspects are comprehensively explored in interrogating positive
processes of diffusion from invention to innovation (Genus, 2012), innovation studies is
rather poor at recognizing the crucial social and political factors mediating the opposite
process (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). It is a matter of historical record, after all, that
innovations can also be refused outright (Godin and Vinck, 2017). And the history of
innovation likewise teaches that it is often only when this occurs, that it becomes possible
to realize alternative pathways that would otherwise be foreclosed (Garud and Karnøe,
2003; Leach et al., 2010; Mortensen, 2018).3 A role for refusal is thus an obvious implication
of the widespread recognition in innovation studies that innovation in any given setting is an
evolutionary branching process, not a one-track race (Stirling, 2018). Just like other socio-
political dynamics, research and technological change involve societal choices among a
diversity of possible pathways. Path-dependency and lock-in as well as multiple power-
laden dynamics of entrenchment tend to reinforce those pathways favored by incumbent
interests (Leach et al., 2010; Stirling, 2019). In plural societies, it follows that many con-
tending interests will not be privileged in the same ways. Yet, refusal itself is oddly almost
entirely ignored in this field as a social or political process.
In what follows, we will first zoom in on the logics underlying science, technology, and
diffusion, showing how often this takes the form of an “obligation to accept” a supposed gift
to society (Mauss, 2002). Drawing on a variety of scholarship on the politics of refusal,
including the work of Black and Indigenous feminist scholars like Ruha Benjamin (2016)
and Audra Simpson (2007, 2016), critical anthropologists and human geographers including
Carole McGranahan (2016a, 2016b), Sarah Wright (2018), and David Graeber (2013), as
well as autonomist Marxists like Silvia Federici (2012), Kathi Weeks (2005, 2011), and
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), this paper thinks through the politics of refusal
to study the conscious and strategic obstruction of field trials that test genetically modified
crops. As we will show, thinking through the conditions, meaning and possibilities of refusal
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sheds an interesting light on the contestation of GMO field trials as a political strategy of
“talking back to scientific authority” (Benjamin, 2016: 969) as it rejects the normalization
and neutralization of technical innovations. Empirically, our research is based on the study
of the GMO field trials which the Flemish Institute for Biotechnology (VIB) organized in
Belgium between 2007 and 2019 (see also Arora et al., 2020; Van Dyck and Arora, 2018),
with a specific focus on a field trial with GMO-potatoes in 2011–2012, which has been
crucial in shaping the GMO debate in Belgium. As we will argue, the business model of
the VIB’s strategic research center with its triple mission of carrying out biotechnology
research, technology transfer, and the promotion of biotechnology through communication
and lobby activities fosters a climate in which it is normalized that innovations from the
technosciences are to be accepted. Public–private partnerships, fiscal incentives, media
campaigns, lobbying for deregulation, and public consultation procedures are designed in
such a way as to create the impression that people need GMOs. The future is laid out
without assessing those needs, including the possibility of refusal. The dismay is great,
when the latter is exactly what happens.
This paper reclaims the imagined possibility – and the normative legitimacy – of GMO
refusal as a generative, deliberately strategic, and politically positive move toward particular
agricultural worlds and away from others. It argues that, similar to other interventions in
pluralistic democratic politics, refusal should be recognized as unobjectionable an act as –
typically massively better funded – countervailing pressure to accept.
Literature : gift-refusal
The gift of the technosciences
Do ut des – “I give so that you may give”. (Douglas, 2002: xii)
Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe argue in their essay on technical
democracy that entrusted with the task of producing “sound forms of knowledge” and after
having been “shut away in their laboratories”, technoscientists cannot come back to the
outside world empty-handed. Taking their leave from the lay worlds within secluded
research collectives, “researchers are accorded complete autonomy, with increasing budgets,
but”, so they argue, “in return, and this is the object of delegation, they must come back
with confirmed facts, as solid as the hardest granite” (Callon et al., 2009: 119). To measure
these returns, systems of benchmarking and key performance indicators are put in place
which evaluate scientists’ and research institutes’ performance. Through quasi-markets of
publications, patents, spin-offs, research contracts, and standardized notions of
“excellence”, public and private investors stimulate competition and control research ori-
entations to make sure it is worth their investment (Deem et al., 2008; Benner and Ulf,
2000).
As part of newmanagerial strategies, publicly financed research centers have been set up to
conduct research and facilitate its translation into industrial applications. In the field of bio-
technology in particular, the close relationship between public-sector science and industry is
prominent (Shohet and Prevezer, 1996). Technology transfer mechanisms – including univer-
sity spin-offs, university consulting, research and development cooperation between univer-
sities and industries, incubators and science parks – are put in place to assure social uptake of
novelties (Capron andMeeusen, 2000: Schurman andMunro, 2003). As research policy stud-
ies have shown, such forms of research regulation have the effect of emphasizing the
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commercial potential and societal impact of the research (Benner and Ulf, 2000). The social
contract of research institutes thus comes with the prerequisite of applicability. As a matter of
fact, Callon et al. (2009: 48) argue “it would be absurd” to finance researchers to bury them-
selves “in laboratories cut off from the world if something were not preserved in the course of
this movement that enables one to turn back to the world with something extra that makes the
difference”. Only “this extra” relieves the scientist from their debts towards their funders. In
return, societies have the obligation to accept the “extra that makes the difference”.
It is in helping to understand what is at play here, that Marcel Mauss (2002) epic essay on
“The Gift” is so useful. After mapping the transfers and obligations between members of a
society, Mauss’ findings go firmly against the established idea that once gifts are given, no
further claims are required from the recipient (Douglas, 2002). As he argues, “one has no
right to refuse a gift [. . .] But, by accepting it one knows that one is committing oneself”
(Mauss, 2002: 52). Based on the study of archaic forms of contracts – including the potlach
in Polynesia, Melanesia, and the American Northwest – Mauss shows how gifts engage
persons in commitments through which social relations are established. This also shows
the foundational character of the gift. As Mauss explains, refusing the gift has a vitally
relational nature: “to refuse to accept is [. . .] to reject the bond of alliance and commonality”
(Mauss, 2002: 17). Furthermore, as Mauss points out, the gift is “a polite fiction [. . .] when
really there is obligation and economic self-interest” (Mauss, 2002: 4).
Mauss’ insightful analysis has been vastly influential, beyond his own fields, anthropol-
ogy and sociology, such as in economy or international relations (Akerlof, 1982; Kowalski,
2011; Mallard, 2011). In this paper, we read the relation between science, technology, and
society from this perspective, including both its “fictions” and its “economic self-interests
(Mauss 2002 : 17) We will show how the gift logic – that ties the giver, the gift and the
receiver – already starts at the moment when society and corporations fund the researchers.
Refusal of this initial gift is rare. This is hardly surprising. Biotechnological research is
depicted as a unique opportunity to engage in a highly relevant, interesting, and rewarding
endeavor4 and offers secure, well-rewarded job opportunities. Furthermore, the exceptional
cases of “scientific dissent” (Delborne, 2008), where researchers challenge knowledge claims
in (molecular) biology and the agricultural sciences have frequently been met with harsh
repercussions for the scientists involved.5 However, the acceptance of the funders’ gift,
which allows researchers and research institutes to establish the material conditions of
seclusion and scientific authority, includes the expectation to give back in the form of
promising findings, patents, publications, spin-off companies, and marketable products.
The observation that this subsequent gift, in this case the promise of GMOs, is not
always accepted, forms the starting point of this paper.
Refusal as a political stance
The act of refusal has attracted interest of critical scholars as a way of resisting, reframing,
and redirecting power imbalances and oppressive logics (Benjamin, 2016; Simpson, 2016;
Wright, 2018). Anthropologists engaging with refusal have framed it as a form of dialogue
in the face of power asymmetries and social hierarchies including class, race, and gender.
Refusal, as they argue, constitutes both a political strategy and an assertion of other, diverse
possible worlds. In theorizing ethnographic refusal, Audra Simpson (2007), for instance,
shows how for First Nation people, politics of refusal are about a refusal to be drawn into
logics and politics that enable colonialism. For them, refusal is a political and ethical stance,
a way of engagement and assertion of sovereignty. Drawing on this literature, human geog-
rapher Sarah Wright (2018: 129) suggests that “refusal is more than stepping outside
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dialogue”. As she argues, “rather, refusal may be a way of reframing debate, refocusing the
terms of engagement, and re-centering it in productive ways”.
Refusal has often been used as a conceptual tool to re-examine history, not starting from
the viewpoint of power, but from the viewpoint of the people that do not accept the place in
history that power attributes to them. Autonomous Marxists such as Kathi Weeks (2005,
2011), Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri (2000) have theorized refusal as a way to not only
think from “the ‘one-sided’ perspective of capital and its reproduction, but also from the
perspective of the workers and their potential to subvert that power” (Weeks, 2005: 118).
They show how capital continually has to invent new strategies to impose work and disci-
pline against acts of refusal (Negri, 2005). Or, as Silvia Federici (2012) reminds us, feminist
autonomists in the 1970s embraced refusal in the context of the women movement’s call for
housework strikes aiming at making reproductive labor visible by refusing it.
Anthropologists discuss subordinated groups’ resorting to refusal in a broader context
including the rejection of authoritarian arrangements (Graeber, 2013), colonial citizenship
(Simpson, 2016), medical interventions and screenings (Rapp, 1998) or biologically based
citizenship (Benjamin, 2016). All show that refusal might have been much more important in
explaining historical developments (or the lack of particular developments) than previously
thought. In this context, Graeber (2013: 2) points to the fact that Mauss observed “dramatic
examples of non-diffusion of even extremely practical technologies by neighboring peoples”,
showing for instance how Algonkians refused to adopt Inuit kayaks, while Inuit, in their
turn, refused to adopt Algonkian snowshoes. In his own work, Graeber studied amongst
others the Malagasy origins and shows how through “rejecting forms of hierarchy and
agriculture such societies can be seen as deliberate rejections of the governing principles
of nearby states, or even as societies that had defined themselves against those states” (p. 2).
McGranahan (2016a: 334), for her part, sees refusal
as an effort, at least minimally, to redefine or redirect certain outcomes or expectations or
relationships [. . .] maximally [as a way] to reject anticipated reactions or responses, and thus
to challenge authority or structure or the rules of engagement in the first place.
She emphasizes that “refusal is a political stance”. Importantly, and in line with the gift logic
described above, refusal is not just a reaction. It is part of a confirmation of relation and
interaction including exchange and equality. Therefore, it also holds potential to create
community, to create connections.
Refusal thus illuminates limits and possibilities. On the one hand, it allows people to
make “an intervention without having at hand a manifesto that fully articulates an alter-
native” (Erica Weiss quoted in McDonald, 2016). It allows one to say “‘no, not that’ with-
out really knowing what the future holds, or even what she is holding out for”, only
knowing “that there is something better”. On the other hand, refusal at least implicitly
goes beyond merely “being and acting in the world”, as David Graeber (2013: 1) notes.
Acts of refusal should be considered as “active political projects which often operate by the
explicit rejection of other ones”. In that sense, refusal is both a point of possibility and the
core of a political act. Or in the words of Kathi Weeks (2005: 110): it “is at once negative
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and positive; it encompasses both a rejection of the present regime [. . .] and the project of
imagining and constructing alternatives”. Refusal as both a “movement of exit and process
of invention” is what can be observed in GMO activism as well. As we will argue in what
follows, refusal in effect makes time and opens up spaces within which to construct
alternatives.
Refusal as dialogue in the technosciences
Particularly relevant for the discussion of GMOs as a gift of the technosciences is Ruha
Benjamin’s (2016) plea to consider the possibility of “informed refusal” as a necessary
addition to “informed consent” whereby the giving of information is implicitly linked to
the granting of permission.
As Benjamin (2016: 971) argues, refusal is a way to open-up the “spectrum of human
agency vis-à-vis technoscience”. She grounds her observations in case studies where people
resist biologically based citizenship in the context of structural violence against subordinated
groups, including refugees who refuse to provide mouth swaps, hair and nail samples to the
UK Border Agency.6 Referring to dominant representations in the biosciences, Benjamin
sees refusal as a form of “political and epistemological hacking” (p. 983); a way of “talking
back to scientific authority [that] offers a prism on to a much larger terrain of action and
negotiation” (p. 969).
Understanding public controversies around new technologies in this way, as we will
demonstrate, points to a politics of possibility. This stands in stark contrast with framing
people’s non-acceptance of these technologies as being based upon anti-scientism or anti-
technology sentiments, a belief, fear, mixing up facts and values, or lack of understanding,
that can be resolved through better science education and science communication (see
Blancke et al., 2015, 2017 for examples of this approach). One of the assumptions under-
pinning such a framing is that people would drop their barriers if only they would under-
stand that genetically engineered plants are not really different from plants that are the
result of centuries of seed selection by farmers. Language of precision, innovation, safety,
and control are deployed to present the former as merely faster and more efficient, modern
breeding techniques and re-assure the public that no fundamentally new or different inter-
ventions in nature have taken place. Such framing of genetic modification, as just another
step in a progressive line of increasing intervention, clashes with the patenting argument,
which at the very same time argues in favor of property rights on the basis of the novelty of
the invention. It also contrasts with views that show how GMOs bring in fundamentally
different views on knowledge, farming, and ecology (Coolsaet, 2016).
As we will argue, the field trial being discussed in this paper can best be understood as a
participation technology to help the transfer of GMOs from laboratory experiments to the
outside world. Indeed, in response to public mistrust, procedures for science participation
have been installed which are supposed to help with “framing the issues”, “defining the
relevant expertise”, and “channeling dissent” (Levidow, 1998: 216). This is not without
importance. The delegation of the production of knowledge and innovations to specialists
requires the cooperation of those concerned whether this be farmers, food processing com-
panies, distribution firms, or consumers (Delborne, 2011). Bringing journalists, politicians,
or farmers to GMO field trials may thus help to smooth the return to the outside world by
making tangible the contribution scientists “make to humanity”. Stuck in the deficit model
of science communication, these modes of public engagement are supposed to orient people
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to discover and approve. Paraphrasing Gage Karahkwi (2019: 76), science communicators
seem not to say “I want to talk with you about something,” but “I want you to listen to me
while I talk about something”. In practice, these control-oriented modes of science engage-
ment fail as people talk back in many ways, including through advocacy campaigning,
asking inconvenient questions, launching court cases against field trial permits, and occa-
sionally by physically intervening in field trials through techniques of reaping, trampling, or
uprooting. While these practices are generally framed as reactionary by using terms such as
“vandalism”, “violence”, or “ecoterrorism” (KGMB, 2013; Kuntz, 2012; McGrath, 2013;
Normille, 2013), we will think with the politics of refusal to demonstrate their profoundly
political and potentially radical progressive gesture. Through refusal, grassroots initiatives
create spaces and times to pursue alternative agrifood practices and relationships. They
change the context within which to explore agriculture and food futures. Rather than deal-
ing with the problem of choosing one or another of the alternative solutions already on
offer, people practicing refusal intervene in the very framing of who is setting the terms of
the debate, questioning which and whose communication is allowed to enter the public
sphere.
Method: Activist “field” work
This article is the result of over a decade of involvement in the anti-GMO movement in
Belgium. Next to, and in relation to activist involvement, the research is based on the study
of mainstream and alternative media coverage, parliamentary reports, biosafety documents,
funding streams, advocacy campaigning material, as well as the organization of and partic-
ipation in workshops, discussions and debates. Importantly, rather than us choosing the
topic, the topic chose us.7 Crucial in this context was a field liberation action, also calle “Big
Potato Swap”, which took place in the Flemish town of Wetteren in May 2011. This event
included a direct action, a farmers’ market and several workshops and debates in which two
of us participated. The action triggered unprecedented political and academic outrage,
which was intensely covered in the media and powerfully experienced at a personal level,
after one of us got fired from her university position and was incriminated in court, and the
other one was subjected to other tactics of (academic) intimidation.
The experience of this happening fostered a need to come to grips with the grounds for
the intensity of the debate. By scrutinizing the political and economic interests involved, as
well as the hegemonic understandings of technology and science which were at play, we
came to understand how the scope for alternative views or opposing voices was being lim-
ited. On these grounds, we engaged in a profound analysis of the political economy of the
VIB – scrutinizing its funding bodies and channels, relations with big business and political
institutions, science communication, advertisement campaigns, public discourse and rhetor-
ic, strategic choices – as well as the positioning of a large group of other actors (scientists,
politicians, farmers, artists, activists, etc.) as they intervened in the highly mediatized polit-
ical debate both immediately after the contested field liberation action and in the following
years. In what follows, we will zoom in a field trial with potatoes that had been genetically
modified to increase their resistance against blight, commonly referred to as the potato
disease. We focus on the role of this field trial in mediating science-in-society interactions.
In this endeavor, we explicitly take the side of those who are marginalized and at times even
criminalized in the Flemish media coverage and wider public debate (see Maeseele, 2010;
Maeseele et al., 2017 for an analysis of the media debate in this context). In other words,
those who question, reject or even straightforwardly refuse a future laid out by GMOs.
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In Flanders fields8
Invigorating GMO development in Flanders (Belgium)
In 1987, Yvonne Baskin (1987) wrote:
No one knows what the real payoffs of genetically engineered organisms will be until the
speculations have been tested in real world conditions. But with all the uncertainties clouding
releases into the environment, even the most optimistic industry watchers don’t expect to see
significant sales of recombinant plants or microbes before the 1990s.
With this statement, Baskin accurately grasped already in the late 1980s that GMO invest-
ment was and is based on the speculation in promises; or in other words, speculation on the
prospect of future sales (Stilgoe, 2018).
Flanders has played a very specific position in the development and promotion of GMOs.
In the 1980s, Flanders was one of the early regions to invest in this technology after, in the
foregoing decade, Belgian researchers Jeff Schell and Marc Van Montagu had been amongst
the first researchers worldwide to successfully figure out how to use Agrobacterium tume-
faciens DNA transfer mechanisms to insert genes into plants. When Van Montagu and
Schell set up Plant Genetic Systems (PGS) in 1982, probably the first plant biotech start-
up company in Europe (Heimann, 2018), and submitted a patent application for the trans-
mission of genes between bacteria and plants in 1983, they established the local foundations
for the transformation of biotechnology research into an economic development opportu-
nity. PGS, which was bought in 2002 by BayerCrop Science from Aventis CropScience, is
today one of the five major plant biotech start-up companies around Ghent, Flanders’
second largest city and host of one of its most important universities. A second spin-off,
Crop Design, established in 1988, became Plant science-BASF in 2006 and has partnerships
with Dupont and Monsanto (now Bayer). In 2012, Syngenta (ChemChina now) bought the
spin-off Devgen.9 The newer VIB spin-offs Biotaly (2013) and Aphea. bio (2017) triggered
new industrial partnerships with the intention of making disease and pest-resistant crops.
The evolving panorama leads analysts to refer to the technology park in Zwijnaarde (Ghent)
as a “green biotechnology cluster” (Segers, 2017) where government institutions, companies,
and universities cooperate to increase Flanders economic competitiveness through invest-
ments in biotechnology.
The VIB research institute, established in 1995 with the explicit goal of applying and
commercializing biotechnologies, plays a central role in this innovation strategy. The pub-
licly funded research institute brings together researchers from the five Flemish universities,
employed around 1450 researchers in 2019, and has its own communication and extension
team. The institute is piloted by a board of directors composed by researchers and a number
of business representatives including from Bayer/Monsanto, Syngenta, and Janssen
Pharmaceutics. In addition to the 63-million-euro yearly donation from the Flemish gov-
ernment, co-financing comes mainly from the European Union (15 million) and from the
industry (27 million in 2014).10 As a return for this investment, the institute must undertake
research that leads to excellence, measured in the number of scientific publications, citations
and intellectual property patents. Next to that, it is also expected to facilitate public–private
partnerships in biotechnology research, technology transfer through patents, license agree-
ments with agro-biotech and pharmaceutical corporations, the launch of start-ups and the
establishment of biotechnology incubators, accelerators, and a bio-hightech industrial
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network FlandersBio.11 So much is clear: the researcher is not supposed to leave her lab-
oratory empty-handed: many agents at the door expect tangible results (Callon, 2009).
The institute has taken this expectation very seriously. According to international bench-
marking exercises, and against the standard of measuring excellence, the institute is doing
remarkably well. Filing patents, preparing high-rank publications, grant writing, and the
creation of spin-offs are all daily practice at the institute. As part of the effort of preparing
for commercialization, the mission of VIB also includes the goal of “informing” people
about GMOs and the broader field of biotechnology (“science communication”).12 This
includes the framing of their products as gifts to society – as means to reduce world
hunger, adapt to climate change, or, in the Belgian potato case, to “reduce pesticide use,
costs and work for farmers” whilst “assuring better yield and easier management” (Gheysen,
2011). Establishing the conditions for the uptake of GMOs furthermore requires efforts in
terms of the (de)regulation and authorization of the commercialization of GMOs, an
endeavor VIB is actively involved in. The institute does not only participate in the national
biosafety evaluations for GMOs, on the European level, VIB actively lobbies for the dereg-
ulation of (the so-called new) GMOs.13 A typical rhetorical strategy used to reinforce these
lobby efforts is that of the “litany of delay”: fear is created that Europe would be lagging
behind in terms of investment in new technologies in comparison to Asia or the United
States.14 The fact that Europe is a laggard in adopting new biotechnologies would be due to
(over-)regulation and badly informed opposition to GMOs. This industry-type strategy is a
logical consequence of the institute’s explicit goal and raison d’être of transforming knowl-
edge into marketable products and economic growth, and to become part of what its
directors refer to as the international top league of biotechnology institutes
(Raeymaekers, 2012).
Field trials as action-communication
One of the instruments to facilitate the translation of GMO concepts into applications is the
execution of field trials. VIB’s field trials, the first of which comprised the release of genet-
ically engineered poplars in 2007, are not merely experiments with GMOs in real life con-
ditions but are the outcome of “a strategic decision [. . .] to break a de facto moratorium”, as
stated in a booklet published by the institution (Raeymaekers, 2012: 74). While biotechnol-
ogy companies had carried out a large number of field trials in Belgium in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, they ceased the execution of test plots in 2003. A public industry statement
details that it would not undertake any new field trials in Belgium until the government
would be able to provide “a clear and secure environment for GMO field trials”.15 In the
preceding years, a number of field trials had been destroyed, resulting in negative promotion
for GMOs.16
The first series of earlier GMO field trials had a fundamentally different character com-
pared to the new ones. According to the Belgian Biosafety monitor, only private companies
executed GMO field trials between 1994 (the start of the registration of GMO field trials)
and 2002.17 While the first wave of field trials focused on the multiplication of genetically
modified seeds (next to limited monitoring of environmental impact) and were thus
“commercial cultures under the cover of experimental field trials” (Denys, 2005), the
second wave of field trials were coordinated and executed by VIB, in partnership with
public research institutes and biotechnology companies and were informed by another
motive. In the institute’s own words, the field trials were in the first place important “in
the development of a transparent framework that guarantees legal certainty” (Raeymaekers,
2012: 74). What this meant is that field trials became a way of “communication by doing”,
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which made it possible for politicians, farmers, and other publics to feel, smell, touch GMOs
(De Krom et al., 2014a: 20).
This action-communication strategy was most apparent with respect to a field trial with
GMpotatoes in 2011 and 2012 in the Flemish townWetteren. The field trial was carried out on
land of a governmental research center situated next to a highway. Copying the shape, style,
and size of public information campaigns for road safety, a billboard was placed next to the
field trial, stating “Here Grow the Potatoes of the Future” (see Figure 1). The institute’s
communication manager described the field trial as a way to communicate about GMOs in
a way that is much more tangible than is possible through leaflets (De Krom et al., 2014a). A
leading researcher of the field trial stressed in an interviewwith a local news site that “this is one
of themost important and realGMOdevelopments for Europe, which interested farmersmust
be able to see for themselves” . He explained that the field made it possible “to communicate
about the advantages of the GMO potato for farmers and the environment” (Van Der
Mensbrugghe, 2011). A government official, in his turn, claimed that field trials may contrib-
ute to the disappearance of resistance againstGMOs as peoplewould be able to see the benefits
themselves. Grassroots collective of farmers and activists raised deep questions over who gets
to say what, in what contexts and with what effects. The collective questioned how science
communicators, speaking from a position of authority, engaged in a sort of non-conversation
in which the latter retained all power to speak and foreclosed “the possibility of listening”
(Karahkwi, 2019) to farmers and other people as true interlocutors.
The creativity, extent, and manner in which people took part, and especially transformed,
the conversation must have exceeded the science communicators’ imagination. Even before
the field trials’ materialization, farmers wrote a bold and self-aware open letter entitled
“farmers do not want GMOs”, and a collective referred to as the Field Liberation
Movement invited people to gather for a field liberation, more specifically a Big Potato
Swap, symbolically replacing GMO potatoes by organic ones. Both the grassroots collective
of farmers and activists raised deep questions over who gets to say what, in what contexts
and with what effects. The collective questioned how science communicators, speaking from
Figure 1. Billboard “Here Grow the Potatoes of the Future” (courtesy DeWereldMorgen).
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a position of authority, engaged in a sort of non-conversation in which the latter retained all
power to speak and foreclosed “the possibility of listening” (Karahkwi, 2019) to farmers and
other people as true interlocutors. The creativity, extent, and manner in which people took
part, and especially transformed, the conversation must have exceeded the science commu-
nicators’ imagination. Even before the field trials’ materialization, farmers wrote a bold and
self-aware open letter entitled “farmers do not want GMOs”, and a collective referred to as
the Field Liberation Movement invited people to gather for a field liberation, more specif-
ically a Big Potato Swap, symbolically replacing GMO potatoes by organic ones. Their acts
of refusal is what we will turn to now.
Refusing the gift
On 16 February 2011, a group of 10 Flemish farmers reacted to the public announcement of
the GMO potato field trial by publishing an open letter (D’Hulster et al., 2011) wherein they
addressed scientists and regulators as follows:
Scientists and regulators, we cannot accept your choice. We do not want your GMOs. [. . .] Were
it not for the fact that we, as farmers, on a daily basis are squeezed into a straitjacket by
interference, regulations and provisions that affect the essence of our work. We often feel
hurt. This even reaches such proportions that our survival is threatened in the near future,
among other things by science and the short-sighted policy regarding genetically modified
organisms (GMOs).
With their letter of refusal, the farmers talk back to the technosciences which “loses all living
connections out of sight when reducing matter to parts”, and “closes itself off from reality
while maintaining its truth claims with power and money”. The farmers’ collective frames
GMOs as “yet another manipulation of their land, their plants, their animals, their farming
systems, their fertility, their life, their freedom”. While referring to decades of policies that
expropriated the peasantry and replaced autonomy with dependence, they assert in their
letter that “it has been enough now” hailing the gradual displacement of farm work to the
sphere of the industry. While GMOs are promoted as “solutions”, the farmers refer to the
“arrogance” of scientists who seem to think they are capable of creating “superior bred
plants able to grow in deserts [. . .] preached by themselves”. With their letter, the farmers
reject the reductionist view privileged in hegemonic visions of science, the political and
economic “choice” for GMOs, and a view of agriculture which highlights detachment
from the earth and mastery over nature. For them, GMOs appear as a poisoned gift:18
the promise of higher productivity or fewer diseases secretly entails expropriation of their
farming practices, seeds, knowledges, skills, customs, and capacities. If farmers would
accept the gift of GMOs, it would therefore mean the acceptance of erasing peasant knowl-
edge systems and ultimately their dispossession.
In thisway, themobilized farmers refuse to let themselves be put in the position of thosewho
are “backwards”, those whowould not have understood that history took a different direction
a long time ago (Latour, 2018). No, they speak with a self-assured voice, situating themselves
within a history of struggles against enclosures and the disappearance of the peasantry. By
doing that they rewrite agrarian history. The disappearance of the peasantry, they argue,
threatens society’s access to healthy and safe food “to fulfill everyone’s needs”. The farmers
turn the argument of the technosciences upside down: technological progress does not neces-
sarily improve access to healthy and safe food, quite the contrary. In fact, and drawing upon
examples of failed science-based progress that turned living soils into dead substrates and seeds
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into patentable goods, the farmers challenge the very approach of producing agricultural
knowledge in laboratories secluded from their fields (D’Hulster et al., 2011).
Crucially, as the farmers’ letter shows, the imposition of the gift ofGMO’s goes further than
the expectance of acceptance. It also requires reciprocity. The farmers are asked to subordinate
themselves to – and implicate themselves in – the agricultural model presented by the gift.
Participating nowmeans accepting the limits that are set by the question (Stengers, 2015). It is
exactly these hierarchies, these social and ecological relations that the farmers refuse with their
answer. They insist on asking different – for some inconvenient – questions, by putting tech-
noscience innovations in their broader context, and refuse to accept the mantra of progress
that “if you refuse GMOs, you will have worse” (Stengers, 2015: 68).
Performing refusal
The second and more visible practice of refusal consisted in the attempt to physically replace
the GMO potatoes of the field trial by organic ones. Science-communication by action was
answered with grassroots-communication by action and the so-called “potatoes of the future”
were swapped for what a grassroots collective referred to as Field Liberation Movement
presented as being their potatoes of the future (see Figure 2). With their action, the activists
took the main function of the field trial – to allow the public to smell, feel, and touch GMOs –
very seriously. The normality of the future laid out in the research institute’s advertisement
campaign was transformed into an open question and political choice.
Giving information on the presumed social and ecological benefits ofGMpotatoes through
a mediatized field trial did not lead to the manufactured consent or acceptance of what was
presented as a gift to farmers and society. “Informed refusal” rather than “informed consent”
was the answer. Through the publication of a public Potato Report,19 media work, the orga-
nization of public debates and, finally, the Big Potato Swap, activists succeeded in reframing
what was presented as a technical problem of the potato disease and widespread pesticide use
into a complex societal debate about science, agriculture, and progress.20 When the collective
declined an invitation for an informationmeeting and instead organized a gene-spottingmeet-
ing,21 they re-set the context for dialogue and asked the questions.22
Through their actions, the collective countered the presumption that people would consent
to the future that is being presented to themby a biotechnology state-industry-science alliance.
They showed that this alliance acted prematurely on the expectation that all involvedwould be
Figure 2. Leaflets to call out for potato swap action (courtesy Field Liberation Movement).
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willing to consentwith the choice for an agro-industrial agriculturewhereby tax-funded invest-
ment strategies in public science serve private interests before others.
However, this refusal of the gift was itself notmetwith acceptance. The potato swapmade it
to the headlines of the television news and the front cover of the newspapers. Politicians,
academics, and public figures were almost tripping over each other in their attempts to be
the first to repudiate the action and the activists’ claims in dramatic terms. The message was
clear: there are no legitimate grounds on which this gift can be refused. The overwhelming
mood of the reaction underscores the intensity of the infraction: that a gift given by incumbent
authority is never supposed to be refused, that refusing the gift is “tantamount to declaring
war”, to useMauss’s (2002)words. In notmore than a fewhours, the actionwas reframed from
the ‘Big Potato Swap’ to ‘PotatoWar’. Fundamental values, like science, progress, and democ-
racy itself seemed to be at stake. The national news channel headlines read “Black day for
science” and the field trial’s leading scientist commented that it is “lamentable for the future of
the country” if “scientific independent research to test a new technology [...] is no longer
possible in a democracy”.23 Irrational fears, lack of understanding, and lack of familiarity
were put forward as the only valid diagnoses for this pathological transgression.
Considering that the grassroots collective had managed to transform a context that was
carefully constructed to be biotechnology-friendly24 into a hostile environment for biotech-
nology enterprises, every effort was made to discourage others from performing similar ges-
tures of refusal as well. Activists were labeled “ecoterrorists”. Eleven people were summoned
and in first instance convicted for belonging to a criminal gang. This included one of us, for
whom university employment was terminated. Other university researchers who publicly
defended the direct act of public refusal were punished in various forms.25 As has been
shown in other contexts (e.g. Benjamin, 2016; Delborne, 2008), the stigma and penalties
placed on the people that choose to ‘opt out’ is big. This does not only show the difficulty,
maybe even the impossibility, ofGMO refusal in a region that seeks economic growth through
biotechnology development, but also the foundational character of the gift logic.
Discussion: Opening up space for alternative futures
When asked whether illegal actions that involve trespassing and destruction, such as the Big
Potato Swap, are legitimate, philosopher Isabelle Stengers answered a journalist of a major
newspaper that “unfortunately”, such actions are needed in “the absence of political deliber-
ation” while “imposing new products and technologies in the name of progress”, “necessity”,
and “scientific rationality” (Boutte, 2011). Both the farmers’ and activists’ GMO-refusal
triggers critical questions about the authority of the technosciences as the best guide for leading
agricultural innovation. The farmers’ letter of refusal shows how the farmers perceivedGMOs
themselves as a rejection of their values, their way of living and knowing agriculture, and
ultimately the existence of the peasantry. The letter expressed a conscious rejection of the
agro-industrial values of the domination of nature and the privatization of life. These elements
of refusal pinpoint the Belgian governments’ failure to facilitate proper conversations around
technological developments and the future of agriculture, instead accelerating innovations
through research funds and biotechnology infrastructure. This includes the investment in
science communication campaigns, such as the field trial discussed here.
Furthermore, the farmers and activists ‘saying no’ to GMOs was not an act on itself, but
part of saying ‘yes’ to peasant autonomy, agrobiodiversity and peoples’ food sovereignties.
Through a press release, the grassroots collective of activists had framed the potato swap
action as “National day of GMO field liberation. For sustainable agriculture and peasants’
autonomy”.26 With the swapping of potatoes, the organization of a farmers’ market, public
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discussions, and skill sharing activities, the grassroots initiative not only rejected the dom-
inant narrative of agricultural progress, it also did the work of imagining and constructing
alternative “liberated” futures of agricultural modernization grounded in peasant autonomy
and sustainability. In physically messing up a field trial, they denounced the imposition of
innovation pathways that involve corporate control of science and agriculture and chal-
lenged the rules of engagement the state and scientists had laid out for them. An invitation
from the field trial organizers for a round table, where the grassroots collective would
receive information about GMO potatoes, was returned with a counter invitation to an
activist-led discussion on the field inviting researchers, press, and neighbors.27 By seeking
actively to shape the form and terms of the conversation, activists built components of their
desired future – one where technology is part of democratic decision-making – in the pre-
sent. Collective research on the roots of the field trial, the research institute’s funding and
industry partnerships, and discussions with farmers about growing potatoes and agroeco-
logical futures, all point to activists’ and farmers’ efforts to reappropriate and reconfigure
research infrastructure and pathways for agricultural modernization. Solidarity actions with
the incriminated activists were crucial in building alternative practices and relations as well.
When more than 90 people, including citizens, scientists, farmers and politicians, presented
themselves in court as “voluntary defendants” – a tactic of self-indictment (Doherty and
Hayes, 2015) – to claim guilty of GMO refusal, they both challenged the courts and opened
up new spaces for deliberation about the technosciences and agrifood futures.28,29 In par-
allel, an initiative of researchers emerged to organize for the defense and promotion of
“‘slow science’, that is, resisting the fast, competitive, benchmarked research, which is,
seemingly unavoidably, becoming the norm” (Stengers, 2011, 2018). The field trial and
the actions it triggered, thus shows that alongside the declared scientific aims, GMO field
trials can hold a far more fundamental – and powerful – political purpose.
Using the lens of ‘the gift’, we have illuminated the ways field trials aim at preparing
people for the arrival of new technologies in agriculture, even before the new products
actually exist. For the case discussed here, the field trial was instrumental in science com-
munication as it enabled scientists to deliberately enter into discussion with journalists,
politicians, farmers, and other publics. In doing so, these kinds of actions become vehicles
for science-based propaganda spreading the image of GMOs as inevitable for agricultural
innovation and societal progress.
However, even more fundamentally, beyond the function of “science communication”,
field trials harness the potent social semiotics around giving, which mobilizes, in favor of
these very particular interests and values, “a gift that cannot be refused”. Discursively
linking GMOs with large-scale global imperatives, like the reduction of pesticide use or
farmers relieve, makes it even more difficult to refuse the gift. Cloistered in their laboratories
and enjoying large flows of public and private money, the scientists cannot do otherwise
than return to society heavy-handed with their own largesse. Great is the consternation if
the gift is refused.
As the field trial interactions in Flanders show, people’s GMO refusal should be compre-
hended as the opening up of spaces for negotiation around agriculture’s futures in a context of
corporatized public science “where the powers to object and propose are present, but under
such conditions that in fact, the dice are loaded, the forces unequal” (Stengers, 2007 as cited in
Farıas, 2016: 54). The sabotage, trampling, or pirating of GMO field trials modifies the form
and terms of dialogue by raising issues to the debate that were hitherto absent, as also other
cases in France and Belgium have shown (Bonneuil et al., 2008; Denys, 2005; Levidow and
Susan, 2007). Through grassroots interventions GMOs’ passage from laboratories to the out-
side world is transformed in ways that correspond with the complexity of real-life science,
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which has to recognize that it is co-produced by public scientists, corporations, managerial
science governance, science communicators, and its publics.
By putting refusal forward as a viable – indeed a vital – political option, farmers and
activists fundamentally question the assertion of technological progress in any field as a
“single track race” (Stirling, 2007). If innovation is to be recognized as the intrinsically
plural and divergent process it is, then options to refuse particular pathways – in this
instance pathways obstructing farmers’ autonomy and peoples’ food sovereignties –
become essential to the possibilities that new ones may be opened up. Therefore, the politics
of refusal studied here may be seen not necessarily as the rejection of innovation per se (as a
supposedly unitary category), but as a forced contestation over the meaning and orientation
of the pathways for change that this entails (Stirling, 2014). That refusal is as stark as it is in
such a case is a direct reflection of the overbearing power relations implicated in the pre-
sumed entitlement to steer a highly particular pathway as if this were the single possibility
(Stirling, 2019). By failing to hear what decades of activist engagement with GMOs has said
about food and agriculture, governments and innovation studies enable the prevailing of
logics of dispossession.
Through acts of refusal, GMO field trials, often presented as objective instruments of
science, may become spaces of dialogue around the socially and ecologically destructive
nature of farming systems. In this way, grassroots engagement with science can contribute to
disrupting the “allure of objectivity” (Benjamin, 2015) mobilized to support biotechnology
field trials. Through activism, field trials are exposed as sources of complexity, ambiguity,
and indeterminacy. It broadcasts complexity through showing that understandings of
asserted beneficial consequences of GMOs are far less robust than is routinely claimed
(O’Brien, 2000). It demonstrates the ambiguity of the idiosyncratically presumed futures
towards which these actions lead, showing how they are far from clear in their implications
– and in tension with many extant interests and values on the part of wider publics (Wynne,
1992). It shows indeterminacy in terms of the powerful positive-feedback loops, through
which the successful enacting of the field trials themselves are – both through the performed
confirmation of expectations and consent – a major driver in the self-reinforcement of this
same idiosyncratic future (Levidow and Upham, 2016).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how activists and farmers turn the story of the biotech-
industry’s gift for sustainable agriculture upside down through the gesture of gift-refusal.
Through gift-refusal, GMOs and the public laboratories developing them, become proxies
for the problems related to industrial agriculture, ranging from monocultures to power
concentrations, food safety, decline of biodiversity, expropriation of the peasantry, and
biopiracy. With the destruction of GMO-field trials, activists challenge positionality, priv-
ilege, and power when technoscience innovations are presented as the normal next step in
agricultural adaptions to deal with issues as broad as yield, climate change, plant diseases
and pests or industrial efficiency.
Public actions against ‘the gift’, like the potato swap action, are deeply political indeed.
They challenge “distributions of power, of effective and affective possibility” (Simpson,
2016: 326). They trigger “the imagination of how action will unfold to reach back to that
distribution for a re-sort, but also for a push on what should be”. In this way, the refusal of
new technologies can create spaces and times “in which we can pursue alternative practices
and relationships” (Weeks, 2005: 122). These “can in turn give rise to collective subjects with
different needs and desires, new capacities and powers”. GMO refusal may also have
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significant implications for wider processes shaping agriculture’s futures. The rejection of
further investment in research that deepens the agro-industrial model is a first step towards
the exploration of ‘convivial’ research approaches (Arora et al., 2020).
Then, why do certain technologies not diffuse? One answer may lay in the question.
Innovation studies, overly preoccupied with diffusion, dissemination, and social acceptance,
fail to pick up on refusal, as an undeniable social phenomenon, thereby overlooking its
undoubtedly potent implications. As a crucial constituting dynamic in the social context of
science and technology, this inconvenient counterpoint has been neglected. For too long, the
focus has been on the study of one-sidedly casted technology transfer imperatives. “Listening
to refusal”, as Gage Karahkwi (2019) proposes, might open possibilities here, as it may be a
way forward for “dialogic encounter”where tools are developed to achieve reciprocal bases for
listening (p. 76). While refusal does not guarantee any direct outcome, it would be a missed
opportunity to classify it “as yet another roadblock” in the process of technology diffusion.
Instead, the interruption of “a given script” can become an occasion to affirm alternatives to
corporate control-based agricultural futures (p. 77). This is alsowhat Simpson (2014) names as
a possible “gain” of refusal: refusals allow the rise “of possibilities beyond the horizon of what
wemay think is a ‘good’ or a ‘gift’” (p. 193). In the case at hand, adopting the lens of gift-refusal
reframes the active opposition by publics to new technologies as a political gesture that can
open up questions about the conditions, forms, and shapes of science infrastructure in support
of peasant autonomy and peoples’ food sovereignties.
Highlights
• Alongside declared scientific aims, GMO field trials hold far more fundamental purposes:
preparing people for the arrival of new agro-technologies.
• Mauss’ theories illuminate scientists-engineers increasingly operate in a gift logic whereby
they cannot return from their laboratory empty-handed.
• A climate is fostered in which technoscientific innovations have to “be accepted”. Refusal
is not considered a valid option.
• Farmers and activists fundamentally question the assertion of technological progress in
any field as a “single track race”.
• Refusal should be comprehended as opening up spaces for negotiation around agricul-
ture’s futures in a context of corporatized public science.
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3. It is, for instance, well established that wind turbine technologies might not have been developed
were it not for explicitly antinuclear national policies in Denmark during the 1970s and 1980s.
While they were firmly framed as “unfeasible” by countries advocating nuclear energy, they now
form one of the world’s fastest-growing, largest-scale, and most cost-effective electricity generating
sources of any kind.
4. Jobsites, research investment platforms and university websites seeking to attract students refer to
biotechnology as one of the most important applied sciences of the century or stress its central role
in addressing human needs and problems.
5. Well-documented cases on the silencing and obstruction of research careers of dissident scientists
in the agricultural sciences include Ignacio Chapela’s denial of tenure at Berkeley University,
Arpad Pustzai suspension from Rowett Institute, and Syngenta’s efforts of silencing Berkeley
professor Tyrone Hayes.
6. The agency collected these swaps with the aim of using genetic ancestry testing to vet asylum
claims. Following public scrutiny and outrage, geneticists argued that the Borders Agency made
“huge and unwarranted assumptions about population structure in Africa” and that these testing
techniques could not be used “to diagnose nationality in the way the [UK Border] project
assumed” (Benjamin, 2016: 980).
7. We use the pronounce “we” for sake of convenience although only two of the three authors have
been involved in the Belgian Field Liberation Movement and they have been involved to a dif-
ferent extent.
8. “In Flanders Fields” is a war poem of John McCrae that also gave its name to a museum in the
Belgian city Ypres dedicated to the study of the First World War.
9. Devgen, the first VIB-spin-off (1997) was initially oriented towards red biotechnology. The com-
pany is now specialized in the development of pesticides and rice varieties.
10. The initial yearly donation of 26 million euros has gradually been increased after five-yearly
evaluations.
11. www.flanders.bio The flagship event of this cluster organization is the “knowledge for growth”
networking event. According to its website, the event attracts decision makers from biotech,
pharma, and med-tech as well as investors, universities, top-notch research institutes,
policymakers, and competence providers (1.525 attendees from 23 countries in 2018).
12. VIB, Organization, Mission and Objectives. Available at: http://old.vib.be/en/about-vib/organiza
tion/Pages/Mission-and-goals.aspx (accessed 10 June 2020).
13. Corporate Europe Observatory shows VIB’s yearlong involvement of lobby platforms which push
for deregulation of new GMOs: https://corporateeurope.org/en/food-and-agriculture/2016/02/bio
tech-lobby-push-new-gmos-escape-regulation. The VIB also claims to be at the initiative of the
position paper “What the ECJ ruling on genome editing means for agriculture, society and
economy”.
14. See for example the lobby letter to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Open
Statement for the use of genome editing for sustainable agriculture and food production in the
EU. Available at: https://vib.be/news/open-statement-use-genome-editing-sustainable-agriculture-
and-food-production-eu (accessed 10 June 2020).
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15. http://users.skynet.be/vita-vitalis/2002%2012%2019%20Belgio%20Biotech%20persmededeling
%20nl.htm (accessed 10 April 2019).
16. In May 2000 near Namur, 200 people destroyed a Monsanto GMO experiment. This public action
was the first action in a row of a number of interventions referred to as “decontaminations”.
Available at: http://www.fieldliberation.org/en/decontaminations/ (accessed 10 June 2020).
17. http://www.biosafety.be (accessed 14 January 2012).
18. Artist-activists depicted GMOs as a poisoned gift https://fieldliberation.files.wordpress.com/2011/
04/d098_webattac.gif
19. Field Liberation Movement. Public Potato Report, May 2011, https://fieldliberation.files.word
press.com/2011/05/dossierpatates-28may2.pdf (accessed online June 2020).
20. A reflection of these activities through videos, press releases, and blog posts can be accessed online
http://www.fieldliberation.org/category/gmo-dossiers/gm-potato/ (accessed online June 2020).
21. TV-Oost reporting on the Gene Spotting, 7 May 2011, Wetteren, Accessed online June 2020
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNSUsfP9q6Q&feature=youtu.be
22. Field Liberation Movement. Le Fieldliberation invite le VIB à une discussion publique autour des
essais de pommes de terre OGM. 29 April 2011. Accessed online June 2020 at http://www.fieldlib
eration.org/en/2011/04/29/fieldliberation-invite-le-vib-a-ne-discussion-publique-autour-des-essais-
de-pommes-de-terre-ogm/
23. VRT-nieuws Binnenland, ”Dit is een zwarte dag voor de wetenschap”, 29 May 2011. Available at
https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2011/05/29/_dit_is_een_zwartedagvoordewetenschap-1-1034895/
(accessed 10 June 2020).
24. Flemish authorities established extensive research infrastructure, tax shelters and other incentives
for R&D activities to encourage collaboration between industry, academic and governmental
institutions in the biotechnology sector.
25. A researcher reported that it was made clear to them not to expect any new contracts in the
institute where they worked. Others received hate mail or were left to isolation.
26. Field Liberation Movement, Press Release 25 May 2011. Available at http://www.fieldliberation.
org/2011/05/26/persbericht-communique-de-presse/ (accessed 10 June 2020).
27. Field Liberation Movement. “Le Fieldliberation invite le VIB à une discussion publique autour
des essais de pommes de terre OGM. 29 April 2011.” Available at http://www.fieldliberation.org/
en/2011/04/29/fieldliberation-invite-le-vib-a-ne-discussion-publique-autour-des-essais-de-
pommes-de-terre-ogm/ (accessed 10 June 2020).
28. Voluntary Defendants Declaration. Available at http://www.fieldliberation.org/en/2013/01/20/
press-release-verklaring-van-de-vrijwillige-verschijners-declaration-des-comparantes-volontaires/
(accessed 10 June 2020).
29. Such as a public forum reclaiming agricultural expertise. Available at http://www.fieldliberation.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Flyer-FLM-28-05-2013_FR_PRINT4.jpg (accessed 10 June 2020).
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